In the first 5 months of 2024, Ukraine concluded 17 security agreements with partner countries, designed for 10 years. All of them lead to the strategic goal of Ukraine's accession to NATO. 

The first state to conclude an appropriate document with Ukraine was the United Kingdom, and the most recent power to have done it is the United States. So far, the Verkhovna Rada has not ratified any of the agreements, and it remains unknown whether they will be ratified at all. 

The list of concluded agreements posted on the President's website looks as follows: 

It must be clarified that these agreements are by no means an alternative to membership in the Alliance. Despite the words “security cooperation” in their titles, these agreements can actually cover many more areas, from human capital to energy. In general, the documents are similar in structure, although they contain the priorities of each individual ally. 

Civil Network OPORA has identified sections that are key for each of the agreements. 

Democratic Transformation and Economic Resilience:

  1. Support for democracy, reforms, and EU integration
  2. Macroeconomic stability
  3. Recovery and reconstruction
  4. Protection of critical infrastructure and energy

Military cooperation:

  1. Ukrain’es accession to NATO
  2. Development of the military-industrial complex and defense cooperation
  3. Responding to new aggression against Ukraine
  4. Countering nuclear and biological threats
  5. Financial commitments of countries in the military area
  6. Anti-propaganda effort and information security

Responsibility for the aggression:

  1. Just Peace
  2. Sanctions
  3. Indemnification, frozen Russian assets
  4. Special Tribunal

Other:

  1. Combating organized crime 
  2. Humanitarian cooperation
  3. Termination of the Agreement

First of all, the agreements concluded are, to some extent, framework agreements. On the one hand, a number of cooperation mechanisms are not fully detailed, but on the other hand, the participants provide for the possibility of amending agreements or concluding additional agreements. In any case, security treaties might be considered political commitments rather than legal guarantees.

Reforms and the economy

The agreements emphasize that the implementation of reforms is a key process in the context of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Therefore, it is described in terms of Ukraine's obligations. In addition, some treaties mention that political, military and financial support directly depends on the necessary transformations in various sectors of the country. 

In virtually every agreement, partners stress the importance of implementing reforms that align with the fundamental criteria required for EU accession, such as the rule of law, good governance, and the economy. On the one hand, such a defined cluster of reforms is a commitment, and on the other hand, it offers opportunities for the transformation of the country.

The partners emphasize the importance of a healthy Ukrainian economy in the confrontation with Russia. Most states confirm their intentions to contribute to Ukraine's macroeconomic stability by facilitating access to private financial companies and institutions, the insurance industry, and the technology sector. 

Contributions to funds and programs supporting Ukraine's budget are no less important. In the central budget for 2024, the need for international financial assistance is planned at $37.3 billion, which is about $3 billion per month. Unfortunately, most countries, except for Japan, do not directly determine the amount of macroeconomic assistance, but for EU member states, such a mechanism is the Ukraine Facility.

All signatory countries undertake to participate in the reconstruction of Ukraine, both after the end of the war and at the current stage. It is mainly about the restoration of energy facilities and social welfare institutions (hospitals, schools). Most countries underscore the need to modernize Ukrainian energy grids and the gradual transition to “green energy.”

The agreements also provide for other types of cooperation (depending on the country): from digital transformation to the development of railway communication. Attracting private investment for reconstruction occupies a special place. A number of states in the agreements replicate their assistance plans for the restoration of certain affected regions of Ukraine.

Separate agreements include Ukraine's commitment to ensure the effective, transparent, professional, and accountable use of reconstruction funds.

In the context of the protection of critical infrastructure, the partners believe that the energy sector is crucial for the resilience of Ukraine as a whole. Allies stand ready to provide long-term support to this area, as well as to work on the cyber defense of Ukraine's critical infrastructure. However, in fact, only France, Latvia, and the United States said they would contribute to protecting critical infrastructure through military means, particularly by strengthening air defense. 

Unfortunately, the partner states do not any describe detailed mechanisms for strengthening the capabilities or de facto ensuring the very existence of the Ukrainian energy sector. The agreements do not contain details, for example, regarding the priority supply of cogeneration plants to our state, equipment from idle power plants, or the sending of specialists to Ukraine to restore the energy sector.

Military cooperation 

The key provisions in each agreement focused on the elements of direct military cooperation. Most signatories support Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration, but their wording is still somewhat different. 

At least 10 out of 17 states declare certain support for Ukraine's accession to NATO: Great Britain, France, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Spain, Belgium, Sweden, Iceland, and Norway. 

At the same time, the United States, Canada, the Netherlands and Portugal emphasize that the future of our country is in NATO, but recall the Communiqué of the Vilnius NATO Summit, which states that Ukraine will receive an invitation to join the Alliance when "the allies agree to this and all the conditions are met." The positions of Germany and Italy regarding Ukraine's membership in NATO also remain extremely cautious and openly unclear.

The partners support reforms in Ukraine to strengthen interoperability with NATO and are ready to develop defense cooperation with our country and the domestic military-industrial complex. However, the risk is that the elements of such cooperation are hardly ever detailed in agreements —only four agreements contain quite clear promises to provide certain military equipment.

Almost all agreements refer to the contributions of states to the “coalition of capabilities” or to areas where a partner is ready to play a significant or even dominant role. In general, the following nine areas can be distinguished: "Maritime Security"; "Air Force"; "Drones"; "Armored vehicles"; "Air defense and missile defense"; "Artillery"; "Ammunition"; "Demining," and "Information technology".

It is important that the agreements concluded provide for consultations within 24 hours in the event of a future attack by the Russian Federation on Ukraine. These consultations will determine the further steps and defense needs of our country. The vast majority of partners commit to providing rapid and sustained security assistance, modern military equipment, and economic support. Unfortunately, the risk remains that none of the agreements defines the scope, timing and duration of such assistance. 

Also, the weakness of the agreements for Ukraine is the lack of specific actions in the event of a nuclear and biological threat. The Budapest Memorandum of December 5, 1994 declares the the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons in relation to countries that have acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968. However, the provisions of the memorandum have now been violated, and the threats to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine remain an instrument of Russia's pressure on the international community. 

Another important component of the agreements is the financing of the defense sector of Ukraine. However, most countries have identified specific amounts for military support only for the current year 2024. Germany will provide assistance totaling more than 7 billion euros, the United Kingdom — 2.5 billion pounds, France — up to 3 billion euros, Canada — 3.02 billion Canadian dollars, the Netherlands — 2 billion euros, Denmark — at least 1.8 billion euros, Norway — 1.3 billion euros, Spain — 1 billion euros, Belgium — at least 977 million euros, Finland — at least 400 million euros, Latvia — 112 million euros, Portugal — 126 million euros. Thus, in 2024, Ukraine will receive at least 22.85 billion euros of military support. Some states have also specified long-term support for Ukraine.

In addition, many agreements mention that, in addition to direct national allocations, assistance to Ukraine will be provided through countries' contributions to the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine (CAP), the European Peace Facility (PEF), the European Union Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM), the Czech Ammunition Procurement Initiative, etc. 

The allies emphasize another critical aspect, such as the countering of Russian disinformation. Russia actively uses propaganda, distortions of historical events, manipulations, and fake news for a consistent information war against Ukraine and its partners. Analyzing security agreements in the context of combating propaganda and information security, we can distinguish three key aspects mentioned in almost all agreements: reinforcing cybersecurity, countering disinformation, and strengthening international cooperation. 

Responsibility for the aggression

In all signed treaties, there is a broad consensus on the need for a just peace, which, in particular, should be based on international law and the UN Charter. Our partners emphasize that lasting peace should be based on the principles of the Ukrainian peace formula, and are ready to join its implementation.

Also, all partner states are unanimous in supporting the current sanctions and their further expansion because "the price of aggression for Russia should continue to grow." At the same time, the allies recognize that more effective mechanisms for monitoring the restrictions already adopted are necessary, and they plan to work on this.

There is also a consensus that Russia must pay for the long-term reconstruction of Ukraine and compensate it for all losses. To this end, Ukraine's partners advocate the creation of an international compensation mechanism, as provided for by the Statute of the Register of Damage, adopted by the Resolution of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe CM/Res(2023). 

That is why clauses on the future of frozen Russian funds have been included in the agreements. All signatories have clearly stated that Russian funds will remain immobilized until Russia stops aggression and compensates Ukraine for losses. At the same time, our allies declared their intentions to continue working on finding legal mechanisms for using the frozen assets of the Russian Federation in favor of Ukraine.

The partners are also unanimous in their willingness to bring to justice those responsible for war and other international crimes committed in Ukraine or against Ukraine. In particular, 13 out of 17 countries will continue their work in the Coalition to find options for creating a tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. The states that did not mention the special tribunal in their agreement include the United States, among others.

Another topic raised by the partners is the immediate release and return of all illegally detained, forcibly displaced, and deported civilians, especially children. The leading role in the return of Ukrainian children is played by Canada, which, together with Ukraine, leads the relevant coalition. Belgium, Portugal, Iceland, Latvia, Sweden, and the United States will also contribute to solving this problem. 

Other kinds of cooperation

Many security agreements pay attention to the fight against dangerous organized crime (DOC). In particular, some of our partners recognize that the Russian Federation uses the DOC to undermine the sovereignty and internal stability of Ukraine.

The agreements provide for joint operations, analysis of the criminogenic situation in the countries, identification and tracking of income with possible further confiscation of assets, creation of joint working groups and investigative groups of prosecutors, conducting training exercises and sharing best practices, etc. 

Also, agreements with all countries provide for the continuation of humanitarian assistance to Ukrainians — mainly through the provision of funds or humanitarian supplies directly. A special place is allocated to assistance in the humanitarian demining of the territory of Ukraine (primarily de-occupied territories and territories on the contact line). Only Finland and Spain provide specific description of the scope of humanitarian demining assistance.

Finally, agreements with partners are signed for a ten-year term with the possibility of extension. The ultimate goal of the agreements is Ukraine's accession to NATO. In general, all security agreements may be terminated by one party by sending a written notice to another party. In this case, the contract shall be terminated after 6 months from the date of sending such notice. 

Detailed summaries of the criteria

Criterion 1. Support for Democracy, Reforms, and EU Integration 

The security agreements clearly state that the implementation of reforms is a key process in the context of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. That is why the implementation of reforms is described in the documents in terms of Ukraine's obligations. In addition, some treaties mention that political, military, and financial support directly depends on the implementation of the necessary transformations in various sectors of our country. 

Given that Ukraine is moving ambitiously towards membership in the European Union and alternately overcoming the stages of a complex accession process, our partners have fixed in the agreements Ukraine's commitments to implement reforms in accordance with the focus areas identified by the EU, including those set out in the recommendations of the European Commission of November 8, 2023.

Separately, countries distinguish the process of reform within the framework of macro-financial support for the Ukraine Facility for 2024-2027 — since the support of 50 billion euros is intended to carry out reforms rather than to "patch" budget holes. Therefore, this May, the EU approved the plan necessary for the implementation of the Ukraine Facility program. It envisages reforms in the economic and public sectors and the judicial, digital, energy, and other fields. Ukraine will receive budget support on a quarterly basis after the established indicators are met. 

In addition, Ukraine must comply with the requirements and structural lighthouses set out in the IMF's four-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program. It refers to the provision of $15.6 billion to Ukraine, which should instead adopt legislative changes to support the economy and strengthen state institutions.

In addition, the agreements mention the terms of the World Bank loan covering the implementation of projects in the fields of energy, financial sector, agriculture, fiscal policy, etc. Ukraine receives these funds through the Development Policy Operations (DPO) program under the guarantees of the governments of Japan and the United Kingdom. The amount of funding in 2024 is $1.5 billion.

Together, all these recommendations and programs make the structure of ongoing reforms in Ukraine, which implementation is emphasized by partner states in security agreements.

According to the "Reforms Matrix" posted on the government portal, now the source of the vast majority of legislative changes is the recommendations of the European Commission (65%). Within the framework of the Ukraine Facility program, about 17% of reforms are carried out, while other measures are implemented within the framework of the advice of the World Bank and the IMF. However, all areas of reforms are consistent with each other and are actually designed to intensify Ukraine's European integration steps. This position correlates with the provisions set out in security agreements with allies.

Thus, in almost every agreement, the partners emphasized the importance of reforms that coincide with the fundamental criteria necessary for accession to the EU: the rule of law, good governance and the economy. It must be recalled that in the procedure of negotiations on accession to the EU, the cluster "Fundamental chapters" has the greatest weight, it is opened first and closed last, it "will be looked at most meticulously".

In security agreements, Ukraine's partners focused on reforms in the judiciary and the justice system, the fight against and prevention of corruption, and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. Agreements often emphasize the importance of establishing and maintaining independent anti-corruption institutions capable of acting with proper accountability and without political interference. 

In the economic sector, our allies emphasize the needs of reforming state-owned enterprises, involving the private sector, increasing investor confidence, transparency and good governance, in particular strengthening corporate governance in accordance with the principles of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

We are talking about agreements and the importance of modernizing the public administration system to a level that will ensure high-quality transformations. In other words, Ukraine should strive to increase its institutional capacity to implement large-scale reforms.

Ukraine undertakes to further implement reforms in the security and defense sector, which are often mentioned as "an important prerequisite for NATO membership." In particular, the agreements mention the need to ensure democratic civilian control over the Armed Forces, improve the procurement process, strengthen the efficiency and transparency of defense institutions and industry, and ensure good governance in the state defense industry, including continuing the reform of the Ukroboronprom concern.

On the one hand, the outlined cluster of reforms is a commitment for Ukraine, but on the other hand, there are opportunities for the country’s transformation. The allies of our state recognize the unprecedented circumstances in which Ukraine has to carry out reforms, and they are ready to help implement sectoral change in technical, political, and financial terms. In addition, in the agreements, the countries undertook to share experience, send specialists to Ukraine and deepen cooperation through various initiatives. For example, Finland is eager to share its anti-corruption experience with Ukraine as a member of the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, and Denmark will additionally support the EU Anti-Corruption Initiative (EUACI).

In the end, Ukraine continues the reform process for EU accession. At the beginning of June 2024, the European Commission provided a positive verbal assessment of the progress of Ukraine's European integration reforms set out in the November EU enlargement report. Subsequently, the Permanent Representatives of the Member States of the European Union approved the framework for Ukraine's accession negotiations. 

Criterion 2. Macroeconomic Stability

Most agreements confirm the intentions of states to contribute to Ukraine's macroeconomic stability, noting that a viable Ukrainian economy is an important component of the confrontation with Russia. 

The main tool for maintaining macroeconomic stability specified in the documents is the obligation to facilitate Ukraine's access to private financial companies and institutions, the insurance industry, and the IT sector. Signatory countries will continue to make contributions to the funds and programs of international organizations and financial institutions to ensure the financing of Ukraine’s budget. On the other hand, Ukraine undertakes to fulfill the full range of policy requirements set out in the IMF program and report on them through quarterly review monitoring processes until 2027. The political requirements include the reduction of budget losses due to preferential taxation, the reboot of the Bureau of Economic Security (BES), the adoption of a strategy of "privatization", and the conduct of an external audit of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU).

Most countries do not explicitly specify the amount of macroeconomic assistance in their agreements. Specific figures are set out in an agreement with Japan, which pledges $4.5 billion in aid to Ukraine during 2024, as well as in an agreement with Canada, which will allocate part of the $3 billion scheduled for 2024 to macroeconomic assistance. 

At the same time, Finland and Latvia say they will participate in the financing of the Ukraine Facility program, which provides for the possibility of Ukraine receiving financial and technical assistance from the EU in the amount of 50 billion euros in 2024-2027. Finland has pledged to recapitalize the EBRD by 50 million euros.

Some agreements describe the role of institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) in providing international economic assistance to Ukraine. The importance of harmonizing Ukrainian and EU legislation as part of Ukraine's European integration process in order to facilitate European investment opportunities in the Ukrainian economy is also highlighted.

Despite the fact that macroeconomic assistance is described in security agreements quite generally, international revenues in 2023 became the basis of the state budget of Ukraine: out of $58 billion of budget revenues, assistance from international partners amounted to as much as $42 billion (of which 27% was grant funding).

The main donors of macro-financial assistance in 2023 were the EU (USD 19.5 billion) and the United States (USD 10.9 billion). From February 2022 to May 2024, macroeconomic international assistance from the G7 countries and the EU to the budget of Ukraine amounted to about USD 72 billion.

In the state budget for 2024, the need for international financial assistance is planned in the amount of 37.3 billion US dollars — about 3 billion per month.

Criterion 3. Recovery and Reconstruction

All signatory countries of security agreements undertake to participate in the reconstruction of Ukraine, both after the end of the war and at the current stage. Thus, the partner states primarily declare the need to restore energy facilities and social security institutions (hospitals, schools) to overcome the humanitarian consequences of the war. 

In the context of the reconstruction of the energy system of Ukraine, most countries emphasize the need to modernize Ukrainian energy networks and a gradual transition to "green energy". 

Among other areas of cooperation, the following can be distinguished: 

  • provision of technical assistance
  • social protection; 
  • energy efficiency (Germany, Belgium);
  • development of railway communication (Spain);
  • digital transformation (Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, etc.)

Many partners point out that Russia must pay for the long-term reconstruction of Ukraine, but this will be discussed in more detail in the “Indemnification” section.

In the agreements, the signatory states note that one of the main tools for the reconstruction of Ukraine should be the involvement of private business. Our partners intend to encourage national businesses to invest in the Ukrainian economy and participate in reconstruction, especially after the end of the war.

Specific programs and amounts of reconstruction financing are indicated only in the part of the agreements. Thus, the UK undertakes to allocate £640 million of humanitarian, stabilization, recovery and reform assistance to meet the urgent needs of Ukraine. 

In 2024–2026, Latvia will allocate 15 million euros for the implementation of reconstruction projects with a focus on the restoration of social infrastructure, psychological support for women, and the transfer of experience, especially on issues related to EU integration. Spain has pledged a new contribution of €15 million for Ukraine and Moldova through the World Bank's Special Programme for the Recovery of Ukraine and Moldova.

Germany, Norway and Italy mention the role of the G7-initiated interagency donor coordination platform for joint international reconstruction efforts.

Moreover, Latvia and Belgium plan to send their investments to the restoration of Ukraine — primarily the Chernihiv region and the city of Chernihiv. Denmark will continue its partnership with the city of Mykolaiv and the Mykolaiv region, and Italy will focus on the restoration of the Odesa region and intends to hold a Conference on the Reconstruction of Ukraine in 2025.

Separate agreements include Ukraine's commitment to ensure the effective, transparent, professional, and accountable use of reconstruction funds.

Finally, the security agreements emphasize on two key components: energy recovery and attracting private investment. Work with these areas is also reflected in Ukraine's activities in the international arena, in particular at the Berlin Reconstruction Conference in June 2024. The event became a platform for attracting private business to the recovery of Ukraine’s economy and the international promotion of DTEK's "green capacities" project and Ukrhydroenergo's maneuvering capacities. 

Criterion 4. Critical Infrastructure Protection and Energy

Protecting critical and energy infrastructure is one of the most difficult tasks that Ukraine faced during the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation. Disregarding international law, the Kremlin deliberately destroys the infrastructure of our state, intimidating the civilian population and forcing them to relocate abroad. With terrorist attacks, the enemy is trying to reduce Ukraine's resistance and force the government to surrender.

As identified in the agreements, most partners will continue to provide long-term support to Ukraine's energy sector, as it is crucial for its sustainability as a whole. Particular attention will be paid to the transition to "green" and renewable energy. At the same time, the agreements provide for facilitating the access of Ukrainian specialists to international training programs and joint educational events with Ukraine.

Some countries, including the Netherlands, Germany, France, and the United States, say they are ready to work on finding additional funds to protect Ukraine's critical infrastructure.

For example, the agreement with France states that this state will contribute to the protection of critical infrastructure, including by military means, in particular through the strengthening of air defense. The same position is set out in the agreement with Latvia. The United States also seeks to increase the resilience of critical infrastructure, especially energy infrastructure, to air strikes. This state, like many other partners, is ready to work on cyber defense of Ukraine's critical infrastructure.

According to OPORA, the protection of critical infrastructure facilities and the provision of air defense for this is one of the most important tasks of partner countries so that Ukraine can continue the fight, and its population does not masively leave abroad. 

Unfortunately, the partner states do not describe detailed mechanisms for strengthening the capabilities or de facto ensuring the existence of the Ukrainian energy sector. The agreements do not contain details regarding the priority supply to Ukraine of cogeneration plants, equipment from idle power plants, or the referral of specialists to repair the equipment.

Criterion 5. Ukraine's Accession to NATO

Joining NATO is a strategic priority of Ukraine's foreign policy. It is the only precondition for providing reliable security for our country. In general, most agreements signed with partners provide support for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration, but the wording used in different documents is slightly different.

At least 10 out of 17 states declare clear support for Ukraine's accession to NATO: the UK, France, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Spain, Belgium, Sweden, Iceland, and Norway. The agreements with them use the wording that "Ukraine is an integral part of Euro-Atlantic security" and that "Ukraine's rightful place is in NATO". The powers emphasize that Ukraine's membership in NATO will make an effective contribution to peace and stability in Europe.

Agreements with the United States and Canada also emphasize that the future of Ukraine is in NATO. At the same time, these documents mention the Communiqué of the NATO Vilnius Summit of July 11, 2023, which stipulates that Ukraine will receive an invitation to join the Alliance when "the Allies agree to this and all conditions are met." In the Agreements with the Netherlands and Portugal, the above wording is used.

The positions of Germany and Italy regarding Ukraine's membership in NATO also remain extremely cautious and openly unclear.

At the same time, partners support reforms in Ukraine to strengthen interoperability with NATO, the development of a modern defense sector, and unification under NATO standards. Even the agreement with Japan, which is not a NATO member, provides that this state will continue to contribute to the Trust Fund of the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine.

Criterion 6. Development of the Military-Industrial Complex and Defense Cooperation

The development of Ukraine's military-industrial complex and defense cooperation are critical to deter the Russian Federation's current and possible repeated aggression. These topics are key in agreements with partners. In fact, they are core in the documents.

Almost every Ukraine’s ally seeks to develop cooperation in the field of the military-industrial complex, but in terms of agreements, the elements of such cooperation are still poorly described and hardly ever detailed.

As to the types of cooperation in the field of military-industrial complex, it is worth highlighting the following:

  • encouraging the defense industry of the partner state to work with Ukraine on the localization of repair, maintenance, and production of defense products;
  • attraction of investments and creation of joint military enterprises;
  • integration of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex into the European defense-technological and industrial base;
  • munitions production;
  • UAV production;
  • strengthening the supply chain of critical materials.

An equally important topic that each of the agreements contains is direct cooperation in the field of defense. Some allies explicitly declare that the ultimate goal of cooperation is to increase the capacity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the level that Ukraine restores its territorial integrity and can restrain the Russian Federation in the future. 

It is noteworthy that some agreements contain Ukraine's obligations to use the provided weapons only for self-defense and to prevent their illegal circulation. 

Other remarks can be found: for example, the agreement with France mentions that the participants propose to establish cooperation in the military sphere "without prejudice to their position in the context of Russia's aggressive war against Ukraine."

In general, the following elements of military and defense cooperation contained in the agreements can be outlined:

  • cooperation within the Ukrainian Defence Contact Group (UDCG), contributions to Capability Coalitions;
  • provision of weapons, machinery, and equipment, as well as their maintenance;
  • improving the interoperability of the Defence Forces of Ukraine and NATO;
  • training and preparation of Ukrainian military and instructors;
  • reforming the defense sector and modernizing the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
  • cooperation in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence;
  • cyber defense and IT capabilities;
  • treatment and rehabilitation of soldiers, prosthetics;
  • exchange of innovative technologies;
  • support of law enforcement agencies, etc.

Almost all agreements refer to the contributions of states to the "coalition of capabilities" or, in general, to areas where the partner is ready to play a significant or generally leading role.

COALITION / SPHERE

LEADING ROLE / LEADERSHIP

READY TO CONTRIBUTE

Maritime⁠ Security

United Kingdom

Germany, France, Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Iceland, USA

Air force

Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium

UK, France, Canada, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, USA

Drones

Latvia

Germany, Denmark, Sweden, USA

Armored Vehicles

  

UK, Germany, Canada, Spain, Sweden, USA

Air Defense And Missile Defense

Germany, France

UK, Denmark, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Norway, USA

Arty

France

Great Britain, Germany, Finland, Spain

Ammunition

Finland

Belgium, Portugal, USA

Demining

Latvia

Germany, Denmark, Finland, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Belgium, Sweden, Iceland, Japan

Information Technology

  

Germany, Latvia, Spain, Japan, Iceland, Belgium

On a separate note, the agreement with Japan regulates the transfer to Ukraine of non-lethal weapons only and does not provide for the development of joint defense production. Japan will also continue to support the treatment of wounded Ukrainian soldiers and cooperate in the field of intelligence.

In conclusion, it must be emphasized that although the sphere of defense and military cooperation in agreements is the most diverse, many obligations are not clearly specified and require the conclusion of additional agreements. For example, only 4 agreements contain fairly clear promises of providing certain military equipment: 

  • Belgium — 30 F-16 aircraft by 2028, one anti-mine boat;
  • Sweden — CV 90 IFV, Archer SPG, ASC 890 aircraft, potential Jas 39 Gripen transfer;
  • Norway — F-16 fighters, NASAMS Sam;
  • Denmark — F-16 fighters.

The agreement with Portugal mentions the provision of Ukraine with Leopard 2A6 tanks, UAV systems, M113 armored personnel carriers, M113 and M577 armored rescue and medical evacuation vehicles.

Criterion 7. Responding to a New Aggression Against Ukraine

In the event of a future attack by the Russian Federation on Ukraine, agreements concluded with partners provide for consultations within 24 hours, in order to determine the appropriate next steps and needs in the field of defense. The vast majority of partners, with some exceptions (including Japan), commit to providing rapid and sustained security assistance, modern military equipment, and economic assistance in the event of aggression. A big part of the allies are also ready to impose sanctions and other restrictions on Russia, whenever necessary.

Separate agreements stipulate that the parties seek to increase Ukraine's defense resilience to a level sufficient to deter and protect against future attacks and coercion.

Finally, despite assurances of economic and military assistance in the event of a future Russian attack, the risk remains that none of the agreements defines the scope, timing, and duration of such assistance. Therefore, the provisions of treaties in this area may seem somewhat declarative.

Instead, the strength of the agreements is that some of them immediately provide for the possibility of making changes, provided that another mechanism for responding to new aggression is agreed. However, the implementation of this scenario requires additional diplomatic work.

Criterion 8. Countering Nuclear and Biological Threat

No specific actions to counter nuclear and biological threats are described in the agreements. Activities in this area are reduced to general statements on expanding cooperation and support in improving nuclear safety. 

A number of agreements (with the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Iceland) do not mention countering nuclear and biological threats. The agreement with Canada also does not mention this; however, there is a clause on continuing to support Ukraine's energy sector with special attention to nuclear safety and security.

Separate agreements contain broader provisions on nuclear safety. Thus, Japan pledged to continue supporting Ukraine in strengthening nuclear safety, in particular for the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The agreement with Norway condemns Russia's illegal seizure of ZNPP, which increases the risks and threats in the field of nuclear safety around the world. It also calls for the urgent withdrawal of unauthorized military and other personnel from the power plant and its return to the full control of Ukraine. 

Belgium, within the framework of defence cooperation, will carry out targeted and specialized training of personnel (including train-the-trainer programmes), in particular in the areas of combating chemical, bacteriological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. 

The risk for Ukraine is the lack of specific actions in the agreements in the event of a nuclear and biological threat. The Budapest Memorandum of December 5, 1994 declares the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons in relation to countries that have acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968. However, the provisions of the memorandum are currently violated, because the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine remains an instrument of Russia's pressure on the international community. 

Criterion 9. Financial Commitments of States in the Military Field

Many allies of Ukraine have tried to document specific short- and long-term financial planning and, in some cases, to report on military assistance provided in past years.

However, many countries have determined specific amounts of military support only for the current year 2024. In particular, Germany will provide military assistance totaling more than 7 billion euros, the United Kingdom — 2.5 billion pounds, France — up to 3 billion euros, Canada — 3.02 billion Canadian dollars, the Netherlands — 2 billion euros, Denmark — at least 1.8 billion euros, Norway — 1.3 billion euros, Spain — 1 billion euros, Belgium — at least 977 million euros, Finland — at least 400 million euros, Latvia — 112 million euros, Portugal — 126 million euros. In total, in 2024, Ukraine will receive at least 22.85 billion euros of military support.

Although the United States, Italy, Iceland and Sweden did not specify specific amounts for 2024 in the agreements, some of these countries have included such funds in long-term planning. Thus, Sweden declared 6.5 billion euros of military assistance during 2024–2026, Iceland — 0.03 billion euros annually during 2024–2028, and Italy pledged to maintain military support at the level of the past 2 years — 8 military assistance packages.

Another 3 countries have identified future military assistance in the long term. Denmark noted that it has 8.5 billion euros for 2023–2028 (this amount may include expenditures on the civil sphere), Norway — 6.4 billion euros for 2023-2027, and Latvia plans to spend 0.25% of its own GDP (~100 million euros) annually during 2024–2026. That is, only 5 countries have identified long-term funding for Ukraine's military capabilities. 

An exception to this list is the United States, which in principle did not specify its financial obligations, as well as Japan. The latter promised Ukraine $4.5 billion for the current year, but these funds will be used for financial, humanitarian and other assistance, because Japan, based on the text of the agreement, provides only non-lethal weapons.

Such a different approach of countries in allocating funds for military assistance is caused by a number ofobjective circumstances. Despite the desire of our allies to fix specific financial obligations, the amount of military assistance will directly depend on the availability of funds, as well as decisions of the parliaments and governments of the countries concerned. This is explicitly stated, for example, in the agreement with Germany, Italy, Iceland, Portugal. The agreement with the United States also states that the allocation of funds depends on Congress.

For Ukraine, this factor is to some extent a risk, because military assistance may depend on the political situation in each country. With the growing popularity of the far-right political wing in Europe, which is often opposed to military support for Ukraine, the scale of military interaction with our country could potentially decrease.

For example, it is worth mentioning the stunning results of the far-right Freedom Party (PVV), which received the most MPs in the parliamentary elections in the Netherlands last year. The party is headed by Geert Wilders, an opponent of military assistance to Ukraine. However, during the formation of the government, Wilders had to give up his principles: in the text of the coalition agreement, it is assumed that the Netherlands will continue to provide military support to Ukraine. And in June 2024, Minister of Defense of the Netherlands Kaisa Ollongren visited Kyiv for negotiations on military cooperation. 

Under such circumstances, in particular the social consensus on the Ukrainian issue, the military support of our state was preserved. However, the elections to the European Parliament demonstrate how the ratings of Ukraine's opponents in France, Germany and Austria have increased. It was political expediency that forced French President Emmanuel Macron to dissolve the parliament, in particular in order to maintain influence in it, without waiting for an even greater increase in the ratings of the far-right before the next elections. 

So, what will be the "political landscape" after the election cycles in some states with which Ukraine has signed security agreements remains in question. 

In addition to the political basis, the amount of military assistance in the agreements remains unpredictable due to difficulties in planning. No party to the agreements can predict what the situation will be at the front next year, what the needs of the Ukrainian army will be of the highest priority and what amount of funds will be appropriate.

Military assistance is formed in constant communication with the Ukrainian side and taking into account urgent problems, so some financial expenses of our partners will be adjusted this year. For example, Finland noted in the agreement that funding for military support for the current year will increase dueto two planned assistance packages.

Also, a different approach to determining the amount of financial liability is associated with the political structure of each country and the internal process of organizing the relevant expenditures. In Denmark, assistance is implemented through the Danish Fund for Ukraine, and in Norway — through the Nansen Program. Instead, Latvia decided to tiethe amount of support to its own GDP. Such an organization enables countries to make more predictable planning. 

Do not forget about other existing mechanisms to support the Ukrainian army. Thus, in agreements, countries often mention that, in addition to direct national allocations, they provide Ukraine with military support through contributions to the NATO Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine (CAP), the European Peace Facility (EPF), the European Union Military Assistance Mission to Ukraine (EUMAM), the Czech Ammunition Procurement Initiative, etc. 

Criterion 10. Anti-Propaganda and Information Security

Currently, Russia actively uses propaganda, distortions of historical events, manipulations, and fake news for a systematic information war against Ukraine and its partners, undermining national unity, spreading panic and discrediting Ukrainian institutions within the country and abroad. 

In the information space of our partners, Russia has deployed a network of its agents and Internet trolls. Their role is to divert attention from Ukraine and weaken its support, shifting attention to the internal problems of these countries.

Fakes and manipulations are some of the main tools of the Russian Federation. They create an alternate reality where true facts are mixed with fiction. The Russian Federation systematically spreads false news about the situation at the front, reports about fictitious crimes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the "threat" from NATO. Such actions not only disorient the public but also influence political decisions in partner countries in favor of the Kremlin.

Analyzing security agreements in the context of combating propaganda and information security, we can distinguish the following key aspects: strengthening cybersecurity, countering disinformation, and strengthening international cooperation. 

All signatories of the agreements declared their desire to improve international coordination in the fight against disinformation and Ukraine's cooperation with NATO and the EU in the context of cybersecurity. Almost all documents also mention the exchange of intelligence on cyber threats. In particular, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands have committed to facilitate the sharing of such data. 

Many agreements contain provisions on training Ukrainian cybersecurity specialists and developing joint training programs. Thus, Germany will support the training of Ukrainian experts based on EU standards, and France will contribute to the development of educational programs for information security specialists. 

In addition, Denmark and Finland emphasized the provision of technical assistance and increased cyber resilience, which includes not only material assistance, but also joint operations and training that contribute to improving the overall security of the country. 

Instead, agreements with the UK, Germany, Canada and other countries contain provisions and commitments to develop innovative methods of exposing and countering disinformation. And agreements with Latvia and Sweden provide for the creation of training programs on information security to improve the skills of Ukrainian specialists. 

Cooperation with partners may include memoranda and additional agreements. For example, in Davos (Switzerland) on January 18, 2023, Finland signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Ukraine, which refers to the possibility of expanding cooperation on digital resilience and cybersecurity. This refers to the exchange of intelligence on cyber threats, the training of specialists and the provision of technical assistance to Ukraine. 

Criterion 11. Just Peace

In all signed security agreements, there is a broad consensus on the need for a just peace for Ukraine, which, in particular, should be based on international law and the Charter of the United Nations. In addition, the partners agree that security in Europe is impossible until the territorial integrity of Ukraine and its sovereignty within the internationally recognized borders of 1991 are fully restored.

All our partners emphasize that sustainable peace should be based on the principles of the Ukrainian peace formula, and are ready to actively participate in its implementation. In addition, some countries have pledged to continue and strengthen diplomatic efforts to ensure wider international support for the Ukrainian peace formula.

Some countries, such as Spain and Belgium, emphasize the importance of future peace summits. In their opinion, the importance of these forums is to involve the international community and strengthen support for the Ukrainian peace formula.

Criterion 12. Sanctions

All partner states are unanimous in supporting the current sanctions, export controls, and their further expansion because "the price of aggression for Russia should continue to grow."

From February 24, 2022 to June 2024, the United States imposed sanctions against 1,682 people and 3,061 companies, the EU — against 1,769 people and 767 companies, the United Kingdom — against 1,708 people and 277 companies. 

At the same time, our partners introduced a number of economic restrictions against Russia, which should affect its ability to wage war. So far, the European Union has adopted 13 packages of sanctions, and now work is underway on the 14th package. The key sanctions are the establishment of a top price for Russian oil, the restriction of Russian banks' access to SWIFT, the refusal to import Russian oil to the EU, the "freezing" of the assets of the Russian central bank. 

It is equally important to limit the access of the Russian Federation to finances, goods, technologies and services that it uses in its aggressive war, such as chips and semiconductors.

The risk for the sanctions policy against Russia is that there are no areas or directions in the signed agreements where it is planned to tighten restrictions. For example, the European Union has never imposed sanctions against Russian gas. 

Also, although Ukraine's partners declare further support for sanctions, they recognize that it is necessary to develop more effective mechanisms for monitoring the restrictions already adopted. We are talking, in particular, about the so-called "shadow fleet", which allows you to circumvent sanctions on Russian oil and oil products or Russian trade through third countries.

Criterion 13. Indemnification of losses, Frozen Russian Assets

In the signed security agreements, all countries recognize, without exception, that Russia must pay for the long-term reconstruction of Ukraine and compensate for all losses. To this end, the partners advocate the creation of an international compensation mechanism, as provided for by the Statute of the Register of Losses, adopted by the Resolution of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe CM/Res(2023). 

It should be reminded that in May 2023, at the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe, more than 40 countries signed a political declaration on the establishment of the Register of Damages Caused by Russia's Aggression against Ukraine. The registry does not have any jurisdictional decision-making functions, but is required to record evidence and information about loss or damage. It was launched in April 2024 and initially accepts applications for destroyed or damaged real estate. In the future, it will be possible to submit applications under various categories: forced displacement, loss of life, torture, sexual violence, damage to critical infrastructure, environmental damage, etc. This registry is the first component of a large-scale international compensation mechanism, which will be created as a separate instrument in cooperation with Ukraine, as indicated in the registry charter. So far, work on such a mechanism is ongoing. 

At the same time, part of the agreements sets out the positions on the future of frozen Russian funds. All signatories clearly stated: russian funds will remain immobilized until the Russian Federation stops aggression and compensates for losses to Ukraine. At the same time, our allies declared their intentions to continue working on finding legal mechanisms for using the frozen assets of the Russian Federation in favor of Ukraine.

Work in this direction is also ongoing. The total amount of frozen Russian assets is estimated at about 260 billion US dollars, but Western politicians are cautious. In their opinion, the confiscation of sovereign assets can undermine the stability of the financial and economic system, which is based on the rule of law, harm the international order and undermine the trust of countries.

Even in security agreements, we see the thesis that the search for ways to use Russian assets will take into account the relevant legal, financial and economic risks. However, if at the beginning of the year proposals for the confiscation of funds caused widespread resistance, now this process acquires the features of a legally justified mechanism.

Breakthrough events took place at the level of the EU and the G7 countries. However, so far it is not about confiscation, but only about the use of profits from frozen assets. After all, after the immobilization of the assets of the Central Bank of Russia in European countries, the central depositories were forced to put some of these assets in the banks, which began to generate profits. For example, the lion's share of frozen funds, 180 billion euros, is stored in Euroclear, the world's largest securities depository headquartered in Brussels, which earned about 3 billion euros in Russian funds in the first 9 months of last year

On May 21, the EU Council approved the use of proceeds from immobilized Russian assets in favor of Ukraine, and the first payment of $1.5 billion is expected in July. Previously, it was assumed that 90% of the expected revenues would be used for military purposes to support the defense of Ukraine, and 10% would be spent on rehabilitation and reconstruction.

A more ambitious plan was agreed at the G7 Summit in Italy in June this year, where leaders agreed to send Ukraine about $50 billion by the end of the year. Technical issues of payments will still be worked out, but it is important that the political decision has already been made. It is planned that the money will come to Ukraine through a credit mechanism. The G7 countries will establish a fund to support Ukraine, where the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and other states will make contributions in the form of loans that will be repaid at the expense of extraordinary proceeds from immobilized Russian sovereign assets in Western jurisdictions.

This mechanism is called Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (era). The money is planned to be directed "to the military, budgetary needs of Ukraine and the need for reconstruction." The process of bringing the Russian Federation to financial responsibility continues, and its next stage may be the direct confiscation of Russian funds, which will be a legitimate response to Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine. 

Criterion 14. Special Tribunal 

All states that have signed security agreements seek to bring to justice those responsible for war and other international crimes committed in or against Ukraine, in particular by supporting the work of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the International Criminal Court (ICC). 

13 countries (the Netherlands, Germany, France, Denmark, Canada, Italy, Finland, Latvia, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, Japan) will continue their work in the Coalition to find options for creating a tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine and means of bringing the Russian Federation to justice for its aggressive war against Ukraine. 

It should be reminded that Ukraine advocates the creation of a special tribunal as a mechanism by which the highest political leadership of Russia can be brought to justice for the crime of aggression. Currently, the ICC's jurisdictional mechanisms for the crime of aggression are limited to the states parties to the Rome Statute, and since neither Ukraine nor Russia, as parties to the conflict, have yet ratified this document, its jurisdiction does not currently extend to the crimes of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.

The agreement with the Netherlands states that, under certain conditions, the future tribunal may take place in the city of The Hague. Ukraine has high hopes for this country, in particular, that it will become a key country in the implementation of paragraph 7 of the "Restoring Justice" Formula for Peace.

The agreements with the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Japan contain a reminder that Ukraine has undertaken to ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC, including the provisions on the crime of aggression adopted in Kampala (Uganda) on 11 June 2010. This is also stated in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

Separately, it should be noted that the agreement with the United States does not mention a special tribunal for Russia. However, the United States intends to pursue the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for war crimes and other international crimes in accordance with international law.

Another topic addressed in the part of the agreements is the immediate release and return of all illegally detained and forcibly displaced civilians. In particular, the leading role in the return of Ukrainian children illegally deported by the Kremlin to Russia or the tot is played by Canada, which, together with Ukraine, leads the relevant coalition. Belgium, Portugal, Iceland, Latvia, Sweden and the United States will also pay special attention to the implementation of the conditions and objectives of the relevant Declaration and/or contribute to international efforts for the return of children.

Criterion 15. Combating Organized Crime 

The fight against dangerous organized crime (DOC) is mentioned in 13 out of 17 treaties. In particular, the United Kingdom and Canada recognize that the Russian Federation uses the NIH to undermine the sovereignty and internal stability of Ukraine, so the signatories of the agreement undertake to take measures to counter it, in particular to groups of persons who have criminal influence in certain regions, including the temporarily occupied territories (tot). 

Countries such as Germany, France, the Netherlands, Finland, Latvia, Spain, Sweden, Iceland, Japan, also support the fight against organized crime, but are more cautious in their wording — they do not directly accuse the Russian Federation of possible funding of the HCF to undermine the sovereignty of Ukraine.

Many security agreements provide for joint operations, analysis of the criminogenic situation in countries, identification and tracking of income with possible further confiscation of assets, creation of joint working groups and investigative groups of prosecutors, conducting exercises and sharing best practices, etc.

However, only the security agreement with Spain contains specific amounts of funds that this country is ready to allocate to the fight against organized crime. According to the text of the agreement, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Spain undertakes in 2024 to transfer technological materials and vehicles to Ukraine for more than 1.5 million euros to strengthen the operational capabilities of Ukraine in the fight against organized crime, trafficking in human beings and weapons.

Security agreements with Denmark, Belgium, Norway and the United States make no mention of measures to combat organized crime. Instead, the agreements with Italy and Portugal state that they will start cooperation with Ukraine in the fight against NCDs when security conditions allow it — but it is not specified which ones.

Criterion 16. Humanitarian Cooperation 

Agreements with all countries provide for the continuation of humanitarian assistance to Ukrainians. Mostly we are talking about the provision of funds or direct humanitarian assistance to the population of Ukraine, as well as financial support to the countries that have received the most temporarily displaced Ukrainians. Some countries, such as Sweden, Spain, Finland and the United Kingdom, emphasized their contribution to the reception and accommodation of refugees forced to leave Ukraine. 

Assistance in the humanitarian demining of the territory of Ukraine (primarily de-occupied territories and territories on the contact line) also occupies a special place. However, only Spain and Finland indicated specific amounts of assistance in this area. Thus, Spain, through the UNDP structure, undertakes to provide 1.5 million euros, and the agreement with Finland refers to the financing of mine action in Ukraine for a total amount of 7.25 million euros from 2022. The budget for Finland's development cooperation and humanitarian assistance for 2024-2028 is EUR 290 million. 

The agreements also specify the mechanisms for providing assistance: international demining exercises, the provision of special equipment, international programs for the rehabilitation of victims. 

Finally, Norway, Latvia and Finland indicated that part of their humanitarian support will be the treatment and rehabilitation of Ukrainian servicemen, and the United Kingdom specified its assistance through participation in the Partnership Fund for a Sustainable Ukraine (PFRU). 

Criterion 17. Termination of Agreements

Security agreements with partners are signed for 10 years with the possibility of extension. Most of them de facto contribute to Ukraine's accession to NATO. 

In general, each of the agreements may be terminated by one of the participants by written notice to the other participant. In such a case, the agreement shall terminate 6 months from the date of such notice. An exception is the agreement with the Netherlands, where the advance notice period is only 3 months. It should also be noted that the agreement with Sweden does not mention the termination of its validity at all.

It is also noteworthy that Ukraine and the United States intend to register the signed agreement with the UN in accordance with Article 102 of the UN Charter within 60 days from the date of its entry into force. Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Ihor Zhovkva also reported that the agreement with the United States would be put to a vote in Congress in order to "obtain political and legal support." 

Instead, the agreement with Portugal states that this document does not have the status and character specified in Article 102 of the UN Charter, and therefore is not subject to registration with the UN Secretary-General.

Similarly, it is not yet known whether the agreements concluded with partners will be ratified by the Verkhovna Rada in accordance with the Law "On International Treaties of Ukraine". This will probably be a political decision that will need to be agreed with each of the allies in terms of the "symmetry of diplomacy".

The future potential decisions of any of the countries to terminate the security agreement with Ukraine may be the same political decision. There are no sanctions for termination of the agreement in any document — after all, neither are there penalties for non-fulfillment of the agreement.

Finally, agreements can and should be improved further. In fact, each of the concluded documents provides for the possibility of making changes, which is a significant advantage.

In addition, the security of our state depends not only on the allies, but also on ourselves. The implementation of the agreements requires serious diplomatic, managerial and personnel efforts on the part of Ukraine itself.